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Meiners: Contracts

Contracts
by Robert G. M einers*

Statute of Frauds
When is one estopped to plead the statute of frauds? California's complex and somewhat confusing view of this question
again perplexed an appellate court in Tomlins v. The American Ins. Co. l To understand how the court met the problem
two prior cases require review.
In a leading case decided in 1909, Seymour v. Oelrichs,2
the supreme court took the unique position that even without
having misrepresented a fact, one might be estopped to plead
the statute of frauds as a defense if he makes a representation
going to the requirements of the statute. Thus, if one made
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a representation that a wntmg was not necessary, that a
writing would be executed or that the statute would not be
used as a defense, he would thereafter be estopped from pleading the statute as a defense.
In a 1950 case, Monarco v. Lo Greco,3 in an opinion written by Justice Traynor this position was drastically changed.
The rule announced in Monarco was that where either an
unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment would result from
a refusal by the court to enforce the oral contract, the doctrine
of estoppel could be invoked whether or not plaintiff relied
on a representation going to the requirements of the statute.
The reasoning employed by the court in M onarco was that
in reality it is not a representation going to the requirements
of the statute that a person relies upon when he changes
his position in reliance; it is the promise that the contract
will be performed.
In the recent Tomlins case the one-year clause of the statute
of frauds (Civil Code § 1624) was involved. Plaintiff left
his employment for another position from which he was discharged one week thereafter. Plaintiff contended that he had
a three-year contract. In the trial court the jury was instructed
that the statute "does not apply where there have been representations that a writing will be executed in the future or
where an unconscionable injury would result from the refusal
to enforce the contract.,,4 (Emphasis added.) On appeal,
it was held that this instruction was erroneous because the
use of the disjunctive "or" permitted the jury to find an estoppelon a "mere" promise to reduce the agreement to writing
without any element of unconscionable injury to the plaintiff.
The court pointed out that the test in Monarco was either
unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment and that where
either element exists the doctrine of estoppel may be applied.
The court went on to say that in holding unjust enrichment
to be sufficient to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, Monarco,
"
. necessarily implies that such a promise, alone [i.e.
a representation going to the requirements of the statute] and
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21
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without either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment,
will not suffice to establish an estoppel."5
Another case involving the one-year clause was White
Lightning Co. v. Wolfson. 6 Here, the oral agreement provided that Wolfson was to receive a certain weekly salary
plus one percent of the annual gross sales of White exceeding
one million dollars. This percentage was to be payable
quarterly. Since the computation and payment for the last
quarter would obviously take some time, it could be argued
that the contract could not be performed within one year.
The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Tobriner, pointed
out that the California cases, in construing the one-year clause
of the statute of frauds, have held that the statute applies
only to contracts which, by their terms, cannot possibly be
performed within one year. The court held that the provision
making part of Wolfson's compensation dependent upon an
analysis of yearly gross sales did not in itself convert the
oral contract into one which by its terms could not be performed within a year. The court's reasoning coincides with
the position taken by the few courts in other jurisdictions
passing on the same point.
Illegality

The problem of the contractor building a horne without a
license was presented in Famous Builders, Inc. v. Bolin.7
The court did not have to struggle with the problem of whether
the statute requiring a license was intended for purposes of
revenue (in which case the unlicensed plaintiff can usually
recover) or protection of the public (in which case, recovery
is usually denied). Section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code states explicitly that an unlicensed contractor
cannot recover. In commenting on this section the court
reviewed the recent supreme court decision in Latipac, Inc.
v. Superior Court,S pointing out the severity of the statute
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and the forfeiture it necessarily entails. For these reasons
the supreme court has been reluctant to construe the statute
more broadly than necessary for the achievement of its manifest purpose. However, factors in the Latipac case were not
present in Famous Builders. The court said:
In the Latipac case the contracting party, after the lapse
of its license, actually later secured a license; here no
later license was ever acquired. In the Latipac case one
of those in charge of the work of the contracting corporation had been authorized by the board to act in similar
work through a license granted to another business enterprise, but here no such license existed. 9
Sustaining the trial court's determination that the unlicensed
contractor could recover, the appellate court pointed to failures, some of them wilful, on the part of the contractor as
additional reasons for its holding. Although the contractor
in this case did have a license when he began the work, his
license expired before he had finished the work. Section 7031
of the Business and Professions Code is explicit in requiring
the contractor to be licensed "at all times during the performance of such act or contract."
Another case involving a licensing violation was California
Chicks, Inc. v. William Viebrock. 10 The statute in question
was section 1263 of the Agricultural Code. Unlike the statute in Famous Builders, it is silent on the contractual effect
to be given to a failure to secure a license. Section 1263
simply provides that "no person shall act as a . . . dealer
without having obtained a license." Plaintiff, the
vendee of a contract for the purchase of eggs, brought an
action against the defendant vendor for breach of contract.
The trial court denied recovery because plaintiff did not have
a produce dealer's license as required by section 1263. The
appellate court reviewed the statutory sections involved and
after an extensive discussion of the statutory licensing requirement concluded that the statute was intended for the protection
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21
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of the pUblic. Accordingly, the unlicensed plaintiff was unable to recover.

Frustration of Purpose
Frustration of the purpose of a contract is well recognized
as a defense to further performance of the contract. Commercial frustration of purpose is codified in sections 1932
and 1933 of the Civil Code. This doctrine has been extended
to leasehold estates by the California courts but only where
there is extreme hardship and total or nearly total destruction
of a contemplated purpose of the contract by a fortuitous
event that was not reasonably foreseeable by the parties when
the contract was made.
In Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverdell an action
was brought to declare a sublease of realty unenforceable
for the remaining months of the leasehold. Plaintiffs operated
a trailer park on the leased premises. When a cesspool-septic
tank on the property broke down, public authorities ordered
them to connect the trailer park sewage system to the public
sewers or vacate the trailer park and surrender their operating permit. Since the cost of connecting to the public sewage
system would have been approximately $7,500.00, plaintiffs
argued that the main value of the lease was destroyed. In
upholding the lower court which denied relief to plaintiffs,
the court pointed out that the doctrine of commercial frustration of purpose is based on the happening of a fortuitous
event which a person cannot control or guard against in the
exercise of due diligence. Plaintiffs did not fulfill this requirement. Assuming that they had, the court then asserted
that plaintiffs failed to show that the event was not forseeable
to preclude "the inference that the risk was assumed.,,12 Moreover, plaintiffs did not sufficiently prove extreme hardship.
11. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1968), hearing granted October
23, 1968.
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Mistake

The dividing line between unilateral mistake and mutual
mistake was the subject of Schaefer v. Califoniia-Western
States Life Ins. CO. 13 A father took out a "Junior Estate
Builder" policy on his son. Subsequently, for an additional
premium he took out additional coverage, known as payor
insurance, whereby if he should die before the policy anniversary nearest his son's 25th birthday, premiums would be
waived until that date. Through a clerical error on the part
of the insurance company a different rider was stapled to the
policy. This rider was used only on endowment type policies
and had the effect of waiving all premiums after the father's
death, not just those falling due before the policy anniversary
date nearest the son's 25th birthday.
The father died and the son contended that all premiums
were thereby waived. The company disagreed. The son
argued that the company's attachment of the wrong rider
on the policy was a unilateral mistake and that there were
consequently no grounds for granting reformation of the
contract. The court disagreed. The court first pointed out
that the father who purchased the policy was not the usual
purchaser of insurance: he "was one of Cal-Western's most
able and experienced sales agents [and] was thoroughly familiar with the policies offered by the company . . ." .14 What
then was the effect of the company attaching the wrong rider
to the policy? In the court's opinion it was a mutual not a
unilateral mistake: "Assuming, as we must, that when he
received the policy with the additional rider requested, appellant's father either did not read it or was mistaken as to its
contents, he shared his mistake with that of the company.,,15
Acceptance

The problem of a subcontractor submitting a bid to a
general contractor who thereafter remains silent was posed

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21
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in Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc. 16 Obviously, silence does not constitute acceptance, except perhaps
where past dealings between the parties raise a duty on the
part of the offeree to accept or reject the offer. Such was
not in evidence here. However, plaintiff relied on an estoppel
argument to the effect that defendant set in motion a set
of circumstances which led plaintiff to reasonably believe that
an acceptance had taken place. The court could find no
estoppel since the defendant had no duty to speak. There
was no previous dealing between the parties.
Obviously, acceptance of a contract may be manifested by
conduct as well as by words. The subcontractor argued that
the general contractor had manifested his acceptance by listing the subcontractor in the bid to the school district for
the prime contract. Relying on a statute, the court rejected
this contention. Section 4104 of the Government Code requires listing the names of subcontractors. No contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor is created by
mere compliance with this statutory requirement.
A final argument by plaintiff was that he was entitled to
enforceable contract rights not by virtue of his offer to the
general contractor, which went unanswered, but as a third
party donee beneficiary of the contract between the general
contractor and the school district. The court, in rejecting this
contention, referred to the same statute. This reference was
apparently intended to go to the test which is most frequently
employed in determining third party beneficiary rights. If
the intent of the promisee is to confer a benefit upon the
third person, he will qualify as a donee beneficiary and thus
gain enforceable rights under the contract. Therefore, if the
intent of the general contractor, as the promisee of the school
district's promise to pay for the construction of school buildings, was to confer a benefit upon the subcontractors who
submitted bids, the latter would be donee beneficiaries. The
court found that plaintiff was, at most, an incidental bene-
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ficiary. Only donee and creditor beneficiaries get enforceable
rights: incidentals do not.
Mental Competence

In a case of first impression, Smalley v. Baker,17 dealing with
manic depressive psychosis and its effect on contractual capacity, the court reviewed the California statutes and cases
dealing with mental competence. Section 39 of the Civil
Code states, "A conveyance or other contract of a person
of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding,
made before his incapacity has been judicially determined,
is subject to rescission . . . ." Section 39 concerns but
one of three types of incompetency due to weakness of mind.
The first is total weakness of mind which leaves a person
entirely without understanding and renders him incapable of
making a contract of any kind. This type of incapacity is
set forth in section 3 8 of the Civil Code. The second is a
lesser weakness of mind which does not leave a person entirely
without understanding but destroys his capacity to make a
contract and thus renders a contract subject to rescission.
This type of incapacity is set forth in section 39 quoted above.
A still lesser weakness of mind which provides sufficient
grounds for rescission of a contract because of undue influence is set forth in Civil Code section 1575. Subdivision 2
of that section provides that undue influence consists "in
taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind."
The court stated that since manic depressive psychosis is a
mental illness, it is clearly a weakness of mind within the
context of section 1575 of the Civil Code. Whether or not
this form of psychosis is within the purview of section 39,
which does not require undue influence, is another matter.
The court pointed out that medical recognition of manic
depressive psychosis did not occur until 1896. Civil Code
section 39 was enacted in 1872, but most of the cases decided
under it, formulating the test of contractual competency, took
place after 1896. Smalley was a case of first impression
since, before it, there were no California cases dealing with
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21
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manic depressive psychosis with respect to contractual incompetency. After reviewing the nature of manic depressive
psychosis and the California law dealing with incompetency,
the court concluded that a person suffering from such a psychosis is not incompetent under the traditional test of competency set out in section 39.
Exculpatory Clauses
In Akin v. Business Title Corp./a plaintiff vendor had
entered into an escrow agreement with defendant escrow
company. Due to an error in recording a chattel mortgage
its value was lost to plaintiff. He brought action and received
judgment.
On appeal, defendant urges the validity of an exculpatory
clause contained in the escrow agreement. This clause would
relieve defendant of any liability resulting from ordinary negligence. To support his argument defendant relied on a 1958
supreme court decision, Simmons v. Bank of America/9 upholding the validity of an exculpatory clause and stating
that contracts relieving individuals from their own ordinary
negligence do not contravene public policy. Writing the
opinion in Akin, a distinguished former law school dean,
Justice Kingsley, indicated that Simmons is no longer to be
considered controlling.
Plaintiff relied on a more recent supreme court decision,
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California. 20 In this
case the court held an exculpatory clause invalid as against
public policy on the ground that the clause was affected with
a public interest. The court said that an exculpatory clause
attempting to absolve a person from liability for negligence
will be held invalid as affecting the public interest if it involves
a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following
characteristics:
[ 1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking
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exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public, which is often a matter of
practical necessity for some members of the public. [3]
The party holds himself out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or
at least for any member coming within certain established
standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the
service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the
party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with
a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and
makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6]: Finally, as a result of the transaction, the
person or property of the purchaser is placed under the
control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness
by the seller or his agents.1
After a comparison of the six criteria in Tunkl the court
found that the transaction in this case was also one that
"affects the public interest." Thus it would appear that the
Tunkl test, originating in a case involving an exculpatory
clause relieving the D.C.L.A. Medical Center from negligence
will be extended to other areas.
Construction of Contracts

Performance Involving Personal Satisfaction

What is meant by "underground"? Does it mean only under
the surface of the earth or does it include gravel located under
a concrete slab? And if the parties to a contract anticipate
such disputes in interpretation, can the builder protect himself by inserting a clause whereby the contractor agrees to
perform to the satisfaction of a certain architect?

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21
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These were the questions confronting the court in Walnut
Creek Elec. v. Reynolds Constr. Co. 2 Plaintiff was an electrical subcontractor on a school construction job. The plans
and specifications called for wrapping of "all conduits installed
underground." Plaintiff questioned the necessity of wrapping
conduit pipes laid in gravel fill underneath the concrete slab
of the building. He raised this matter with the architect for
whom he had to perform "to satisfaction." After consulting
the expert opinion of an electrical engineer employed by him
as a consultant on the project, the architect asserted that
wrapping was included in the specifications. Plaintiff did
the wrapping under protest and billed defendant general contractor for the amount involved.
The trial court did not pass on the question of what "underground" meant as set forth in this contract, but found that
plaintiff had agreed to the finality of the architect's determination. On appeal, the court disagreed. It held that the
word "underground" was ambiguous and that despite the
clause in the contract whereby plaintiff agreed to do the work
"according to the plans and specifications and to the full
satisfaction of said Architect," the architect was not the final
arbiter of this dispute. The court construed the above language as giving the architect authority to decide on matters
of quality and quantity of performance, not to render "a
legal interpretation of the subcontract or to resolve ambiguities
in the plans and specifications."
It would appear that if one anticipates any differences
of opinion as to what is called for in contractual plans
and specifications, and wants a third party to be the final
decision-maker, he had best include definite language.
Arbitration

Contracts containing clauses in which the parties agreed
to submit disputes to arbitration were the subjects of three
cases. In two cases one of the parties to the contract was
resisting arbitration. In the third, the dispute had gone to
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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arbitration and the losing party sought to have the award set
aside while the winner sought to have the award confirmed.
In Bianco v. Superior Court,3 the contract contained the
standard clause, "In the event that a dispute shall arise between the parties relating to this agreement, such dispute shall
be submitted to arbitration . . . ". Plaintiffs filed a complaint for rescission of the contract and for other relief.
Defendant petitioned the court for an order compelling arbitration, and the court granted his petition. On appeal, the
order compelling arbitration was set aside. Section 1281.2
of the Code of Civil Procedure contains two restrictions,
one of which is that "grounds exist for the revocation of the
agreement." The court discussed the statutory history of
this provision and concluded that when such a petition is
made, it is the duty of the court to determine whether or not
grounds exist for revocation of the contract. This, the trial
court failed to do when it issued its order compelling arbitration.
In A & E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Company,4 the
9th circuit reversed the district court's denial of an injunction
against arbitration on the grounds that the lower court abused
its discretion. The party resisting arbitration had alleged
that the contract violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Since
one of the issues to be arbitrated involved a crucial factual
anti-trust issue, this issue was not a proper subject for arbitration.
The case of United States v. Ets-Hokin Corporation 5 illustrates the problem encountered by the parties when they do
not submit to the arbitrator a stipulated issue for his final
resolution. California law is the same as federal law insofar
as grounds for vacating an award are concerned. Under
section 1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one of the
grounds for setting aside an arbitrator's award is that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority. How can a court determine
whether or not an arbitrator, in rendering his award, has
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exceeded his authority when there is no stipulation as to
exactly what he is to decide? Because of the difficulty in
answering this question, it is the practice of many arbitrators,
when the parties cannot agree in framing the issue, to have
them stipulate that after hearing the evidence and arguments,
the arbitrator shall determine the issue and then proceed to
decide it. Such was not the situation here. However, after
an extensive discussion of the record of the arbitration proceedings, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not
exceed his authority. The court also reiterated the majority
view that regardless of the degree to which the view of an
arbitrator on the facts and the law may be open to question,
a court will not set the award aside for errors either in law
or in fact. In short, a court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the arbitrator.
Repudiation of Breach

Whether or not an employer had repudiated its breach
of contract before the employee had changed her position,
was the issue facing the court in Pichignau v. City of Paris. 6
It is clear that under California law, a party who has committed a breach of contract can repudiate the breach and
thus be liable only for damages between the time of the breach
and the repudiation of the breach, rather than for the entire
remainder of the contract. In the Pichignau case, plaintiff
was employed as a saleslady at I. Magnin's, a leading fashion
store in San Francisco. She met Madame De Tessan, a
principal shareholder and chairman of the board of directors
of City of Paris, a well known San Francisco department
store. After negotiations, plaintiff entered into a five-year
contract of employment with City of Paris. Eighteen months
later, City of Paris terminated the contract.
It was conceded for purposes of the trial of defendant's
special defense that defendant had breached the contract.
The critical issue facing the court was whether defendant
had repudiated its breach before plaintiff had changed her
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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position. A series of letters were exchanged between the
parties. Plaintiff was offered re-employment at her former
salary, but subject to discharge on 15 days' notice and subject
also to defendant's right to insist that the contract had been
terminated when plaintiff was first discharged. The court
pointed out that retraction of breach must be clear and
unequivocal and that the party who purports to repudiate
its breach may not impose new conditions not in accord with
the original contract.
Damages

Amerson v. Christman7 involves a somewhat complex situation in which a number of separate appeals were filed. In
the lower court, plaintiff homeowner sued defendant contractor for breach of a contract to construct a house. From
that judgment, which held that the contractor was in breach
and awarded plaintiff $11,931.62, the homeowner filed two
appeals and the contractor, one. On the question of damages
the court reiterated the usual rule that when the contractor
breaches, the measure of damages is the cost of completion.
On the question of special damages, plaintiff introduced evidence as to his loss of use of the house and the cost of caring
for his mother and son. The trial court refused to award
special damages despite the fact that plaintiff's testimony
was uncontroverted. The appellate court returned the matter
to the trial court for an assessment of special damages, after
quoting section 3300 of the Civil Code. The court also
refused to find a novation, pointing out the usual requirement
that a novation involves the substitution of a new obligation
for an existing one and thus the extinguishment of the old
contract.
The problem of awarding loss of profits as part of plaintiff's
damages resulting from defendant's breach of contract was
encountered in Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. A.J. Industries,
Inc. s Defendant owned a gold mine in Juneau, Alaska. Plaintiff purchased all the facilities for salvage purposes. When
7. 261 Cal. App.2d 811, 68 Cal. Rptr.
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defendant breached, the lower court assessed damages on
the basis of the difference between the gross price for which
the materials could have been sold at the nearest market and
the gross cost to plaintiff for purchasing and dismantling the
materials and transporting them to the market. The defendant argued for the more familiar measure of damages rule
applicable to a sale of goods, i.e., the difference between
contract price and market price. To this argument the appellate court replied as follows: "Defendant's breach (repudiation) of the contract prevented plaintiffs from salvaging and
reselling any of the materials. In the circumstances, the
court could properly award plaintiffs the loss of anticipated
profits resulting from defendant's breach."9
Parol Evidence

The introduction of parol evidence in cases involving written instruments was the subject of several cases. In Masterson
v. Sine/a Masterson and his wife had conveyed real property
to Sine and his wife, Masterson's sister. Part of the transaction
included an option whereby the grantors could repurchase
the property from the grantees. Thereafter, Masterson was
adjudged bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy and his wife
brought this action for declaratory relief to establish their
right to enforce the option. The trial court refused to allow
the admission of extrinsic evidence offered by the Sines to
show that the parties wanted the property kept in the Masterson family and that the option was thus personal to the
Mastersons and could not be exercised by Mr. Masterson's
trustee in bankruptcy. The court based the exclusion of such
testimony on the parol evidence rule. The supreme court,
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Traynor, held this to
be error.
Whether or not the parol evidence rule prevents the introduction of extrinsic evidence depends initially upon whether
or not the parties to a written contract have agreed to its
being a complete and final embodiment of the terms of the
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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contract, i.e., an integration. If they have not, the second
consideration is whether or not the extrinsic evidence which
is offered adds to or varies the terms of the written contract.
If it does not and the writing is not an integration, extrinsic
evidence may be admitted.
However, the problem is further complicated by this question: how do you determine whether or not the parties
intended the written contract to be a complete and final
integration of their transaction? Specifically, do you arrive
at this determination by examining only the written instrument
or do you consider the extrinsic evidence and its relevance
to the writing? The court pointed out that California cases
have held that whether or not there is an integration must
be determined solely from the face of the written instrument.
This rule has not been consistently applied however and the
requirement that the writing must appear incomplete on its
face has been repudiated in many other California cases.
The court noted that in formulating a rule governing parol
evidence, several policies must be accommodated. One policy
is based on an assumption that written evidence is more accurate than human memory. Another policy is the fear of
fraud by interested parties.
In the opinion of the court, evidence of oral collateral
agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is
likely to be misled. Therefore, the rule must be based on the
credibility of the evidence. One standard is that of section
240 (1) (b) of the Restatement of Contracts which allows
evidence of a collateral agreement if it "might naturally be
made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were
the parties to the written contract." The Uniform Commercial Code section 2-202 would exclude such evidence in even
fewer cases. The official comment to this section states, "If
the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would
certainly have been included in the document.
. then
evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier
of fact."
Applying this reasoning to the case at hand the court pointed
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21
out that the deed was silent on the question of assignability.
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The type of instrument was then considered when the court
reasoned that the difficulty of accommodating the formalized
structure of a deed to the insertion of collateral agreements
makes it less likely that all the terms of such an agreement
were included. The court speculated on reasons why the
option may have been placed in the deed and concluded
that this case is one in which it can be said that a collateral
agreement such as this "might naturally be made as a separate agreement" (using the Restatement test). From this,
the court reasoned, "A fortiori, the case is not one in which
the parties 'would certainly' have included the collateral agreement"ll (using the V.e.e. test, without pointing out that it
has no application to a transaction involving real property).
Thus, the court concluded that the evidence offered to prove
that the parties agreed that the option was not assignable to
one other than a person in the Masterson family should have
been admitted.
Dissenting, Justice Burke, with whom Justice McComb
concurred, said that the majority opinion undermines the parol
evidence rule as it has been known since 1872, renders suspect
instruments of conveyance absolute on their face, materially
lessens the reliance which can be placed on written instruments which affect title to realty, and opens the door, albeit
unintentionally, to a new technique for the defrauding of
creditors. The majority was also said to have arrived at its
holding by a series of false premises not supported either in
the record of this case or in the California cases cited.
In Houghton v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp.,12 a clause in the
written contract provided, "In the event the company decides
to discontinue the plastic [sic] division, you will be guaranteed one year's basic salary in advance at time of termination." Was the employee entitled to the one year's salary
if the employer transferred the business to another corporation? Or was he entitled to the salary only if he lost his
job? (In this case the employee continued his employment
with no interruption in pay but with a new employer.) NatPublished by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

11. 68 Cal.2d at 228-229, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 549, 436 P.2d at 565.

12. 261 Cal. App.2d 530, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 43 (1968).
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urally the plaintiff-employee argued the former premise and
the defendant-employer, the latter.
The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence as to the meaning
of the written provision in the contract. This was held to be
error and the judgment for plaintiff was reversed. The trial
court, in accepting defendant's version of the meaning and
effect of the paragraph quoted above committed reversible
error because there was no substantial evidence to support
the interpretation which it adopted. Although the appellate
court did agree that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to
show the circumstances under which an agreement was made,
it pointed out that certain parol evidence concerning what
the parties intended the meaning of the integration to be,
cannot be admitted as an aid in interpreting the writing.
In two cases concerning leases, Beverly Hills Oil Co. v.
Beverly Hills Unified Sch. District 13 and Interpublic Group at
Companies v. On Mark Engineering CO.,14 involve the usual
question of whether or not an ambiguity exists in the language
of a written integration. Obviously, if an ambiguity does
exist, parol evidence is admissible, since it does not add to or
vary the terms of the writing. It helps to determine what
the terms of the writing are. In both cases it was held that
ambiguity existed in the written integration and that parol
evidence was thus properly admitted.
Specific Performance
In Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc./ 5 a
purchaser under a written agreement for the sale of real
property sought specific performance of the contract after the
defendant-seller committed an anticipatory breach. The
"cardinal issue" was whether or not the plaintiff-purchaser
was financially ready and able to pay the purchase price
within the time required by the contract. Plaintiff contended
that he need only prove an ability to pay the purchase price
at the time of trial as distinguished from the time required
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/21

13. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1968).
14. 381 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. [1967]).
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under the contract. The court rejected this contention and
stated that an essential basis for specific performance must
be a showing of performance, tender of performance, or
ability and willingness to perform within the time required
by the contract. If such showing is not made, specific performance will be denied, notwithstanding a breach by the
seller.

*
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